On Soeharto's liminal problem

Power accumulates in many ways. In Javanese view, however, power is concrete and constant, argued Ben Anderson, an old hand in Indonesian studies, years ago. But, what if a (Javanese) man, once the most powerful in this country, having lost his formal authority for almost a decade, doesn't totally lose power and influence? Soeharto has a so-called "liminal" problem.

Soeharto, Indonesia's second president and former dictator, has uniquely suffered for too long. Since July 1999, just a year after his demise, he went back and forth to the hospital. Time and again he was released, a bit healthier than before, yet only to enter the hospital again some time later. This pattern has continued for almost a decade. In total, he had been hospitalized at least 14 times as a result of ailing health and old age.

Medical aspects aside, this process raises a question of transition, a political and cultural one.

For, like it or not, Soeharto is a phenomenon. Each time he was brought to the hospital, a growing number of (former) state dignitaries who had served under him, paid visit and homage. And each time he's thus back on the headlines, his opponents remind the public of his alleged civil and criminal past.

Among his supporters, there has been a sort of state ritual, albeit rather informal, in the making. For, to pay a visit is to honor the man being visited, but it's also a demonstration of the visitors' loyalty and allegiance; possibly with some interests projected on his family business. They carefully conveyed publicmessages of empathy, forgiveness, even proposals to the effect of dropping all legal charges on him.

Consequently, each time the former dictator got sick, he is at the center of a new controversy. Soeharto's health thus creates a momentum that forces many to show where they -- former loyalists, supporters and clients -- now really stand. For Soeharto's opponents, it revived a vivid debate on Soeharto's past crimes. Some proposed to bring him to justice.

Over time, it may be expected that both the hospital-visit ritual by the supporters and the debate on Soeharto's legacy, corruption and crime among his opponents, may become routine and loses their relevance. Wrong. The visit ritual and the debateonly intensified as Soeharto's ailing health got worse. Both sides have to get used to it, and silently expect that his final day would soon come.

While Soeharto has definitely left his status of most powerful; he left one past stage, yet has not entered a new one. Such a station-in-between carries characteristics of an earlier stage without, however, acquiring new ones. Anthropologists pioneered by Victor Turner (1967) call it a liminal phase. It's a critical stage in any human society; hence, it's significant aspart of society's rites of passages.

An obvious example from our society is the circumcision of a Muslim boy. Once circumcised, the boy is no longer a stupid child, but is ready to reach a status of a man (akil baliq), or, in Javanese term, ready to become civilized. In reality, though,he is neither the yesterday boy nor a new man.

To simplify: similarly, Soeharto is no longer what he used to be, but, thanks to the visit ritual, he is still able to show some power and influence; yet, at the same time, now at 86, he is about to enter a final stage where he would be without power at all.

Soeharto, of course, had always been aware of his past privilege (abuse, that is) of being most powerful man, so he too must have recognized how his power had accumulated during his good old days. This is the way we understand power in "western", rational sense.

Viewed in Javanese way as Soeharto would have it, power, being something concrete, is always clearly marked by concrete acts and events; and, being constant, it is always a zero sum i.e. you get more at the cost of your counterparts -- or subjects, for that matter -- getting less; never a win-win, but always win and lose.

The ritual of hospital visits of (former) state dignitaries are concrete events which clearly illustrate this relationship that goes for Soeharto winning more and his former subjects getting less -- in terms of political status and image, that is.

The ambiguity of Soeharto's liminal status means that whatever "power" he possesses is no longer relevant even for him, and that the ritual of his loyal and humble (former) dignitaries only serve their own interests.

Time and again Soeharto has been able to turn critical events in his terms, such as his succession (lengser keprabon, a royal abdication as he would have it) on May 21, 1998 when he said "I decide to quit". Now it's virtually for the first time that other -- God, as they say -- would do it for him.

Since Soeharto's rule is viewed as an antithesis of all virtues of democracy, the homage ritual by his supporters cannot virtues of democracy, the homage ritual by his supporters cannot be seen as acts that serve Indonesia's new democracy and its people.

Soeharto himself never did it: he only visited Gen. A.H. Nasution's and President Sukarno's families after they died. The phenomenon of Soeharto's illness and the ritual have by now led to a kind of Soeharto fatigue.

On balance, while the hospital visit ritual by Soeharto loyalists did nothing to educate the nation on democracy, the debate and discourses on Soeharto legacy are clearly more useful -- certainly as many of his critics would remind the public of him being politically responsible for 1965 mass killings, EastTimor genocide, Aceh bloodbath and massive corruption.

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Jakarta .The writer is a journalist and can be contacted at aboeprijadi@gmail.com.